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British Labour Movement Solidarity in the 1913-14 Dublin Lockout 
Abstract 
While most accounts of the Dublin Lockout of 1913-14 consider it primarily as an event in 
Irish history, it was also one of the most important struggles in twentieth century British 
history. It was influenced by, and was an integral part of the great ‘labour unrest’ that swept 
over Britain in the years 1911 to 1914 and had tremendous repercussions in Britain as well 
as Ireland. This article provides much neglected analysis of the nature, extent and dynamics 
of the solidarity campaign that was generated on the British mainland for the Lockout 
(probably the only other comparable event was the national miners’ strike of 1984-5), the 
reasons why such widespread support was forthcoming, and its broader implications for 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of militant trade unionism in Britain during this 
period. It provides a comprehensive re-examination of the historical record and offers a 
critical analysis of existing predominant historiographical interpretations of the dispute. In 
the process, the article provides new insights on the potential and limits of Jim Larkin’s 
campaign to secure sympathetic industrial action inside the British labour movement, the 
refusal of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) to support such an initiative, and the inability of 
rank-and-file and socialist militants to overcome the entrenched resistance of the official 
union leadership. 
The Dublin lockout of 1913-14 is the most important industrial struggle in Irish history. 
25,000 workers were locked out of their place of employment by over 400 employers for 
refusing to sign an undertaking not to be a member of Jim Larkin’s Irish Transport and 
General Workers’ Union (ITGWU). It represented a concerted attempt to crush independent 
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and militant trade union organisation within Dublin. In the past, the ITGWU’s great strength 
had been working class solidarity whereby individual employers who found themselves in 
dispute with a group of workers having to confront the strength of the whole union via 
sympathetic strike action mobilised against them. The lockout effectively countered this, 
with working class solidarity now matched by employers’ solidarity as the union found itself 
plunged into a prolonged battle of attrition designed to bleed away its resources, both 
financial and moral. With inspirational defiance, courage and tenacity the Dublin workers, 
many of them casual labourers with the lowest wages and worst living standards in Western 
Europe, held out for nearly six months between 26 August 1913 and 18 January 1914 in a 
battle of epic proportions, before finally being driven back to work defeated.  
While most accounts of the Dublin Lockout consider it primarily as an event in Irish 
history, it was also one of the most important struggles in twentieth century British history. 
It was influenced by, and was an integral part of the great ‘labour unrest’ that swept over 
Britain in the years 1911 to 1914 and had tremendous repercussions in Britain as well as 
Ireland.1 While the embattled ITWU was stanchly nationalist, Ireland was still part of the 
‘United Kingdom’ and the union regarded itself as part of the widespread movement of 
working class insurgency that was challenging employers, government and union officials in 
both countries. Larkin’s explicit attempt to spread the dispute into the heart of the British 
labour movement - via the appeal to take sympathetic industrial action in support of their 
Dublin counterparts by refusing to handle ‘tainted goods’ - served to underline its 
ramifications. If a victory for the Dublin workers might have shaken the resolve of employers 
throughout Britain, the defeat of the Dublin workers only gave them encouragement. 
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Yet rremarkably little detailed attention has been given to the nature, extent and 
dynamics of the solidarity campaign that was generated on the British mainland for the 
Lockout (probably the only other comparable event was the national miners’ strike of 1984-
5), the reasons why such widespread support was forthcoming, and its broader implications 
for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of militant trade unionism in Britain during 
this period. In an attempt to fill the gap, this article provides a comprehensive re-
examination of the historical record (including Board of Trade Reports; Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) Reports; trade union archives; daily newspapers and the radical press), in 
the process foregrounding hitherto neglected aspects of the subject and deploying new 
archival findings to explore the potential and limits of Larkin’s campaign to secure 
sympathetic industrial action inside the British labour movement. 
Moreover it offers a critical analysis of existing predominant historiographical 
interpretations of the dispute presented by Padraig Yeates, Emmet O’Connor and others. 
These have claimed that Larkin’s lacerating personal attacks on individual British labour 
movement figures for their failure to organise sympathetic industrial action was a ‘fatal 
mistake’,2 and that the decision taken at a special Trades Unions Congress (TUC) conference 
to refuse to agree to mobilise official trade union support for such action should not be 
understood as a ‘betrayal’ of the Dublin strikers.3 
 The article utilises evidence to suggest that while it was the solidarity of the British 
labour movement that allowed the Dublin workers to survive for as long as they did, a 
crucial contributory factor explaining why they went down to defeat (apart from the fierce 
opposition mounted by the Dublin employers backed up by the police, judiciary and Catholic 
Church) was the TUC’s refusal to mobilise sympathetic industrial action in Britain. Such 
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sympathy action (in the context of the strike unrest of 1910–13 and momentum for a 
campaign of industrial unity between different sections) was by no means a completely 
unrealistic prospect, even though whether it would have ensured a different outcome to the 
dispute is unknowable. Larkin’s critique of British labour movement leaders must be 
understood within the context of his own direct experiences of trade union officialdom and 
his embrace of the syndicalist analysis of the limitations of union officialdom. Rank-and-file 
militants (and syndicalist and socialist activists generally) were too unorganised and 
uncoordinated to overcome the entrenched resistance of the official union leadership. This 
difficulty was compounded by the way Larkin’s solidarity appeal fell between the alternative 
stools of a pure ‘rank-and-filist’ approach from below on the one hand (that effectively 
dismissed the trade union ‘bureaucracy’ in favour of unofficial membership action) and a 
primary orientation on official union action from above on the other (that effectively placed 
reliance on the ‘bureaucracy’ to mobilise membership action), rather than being orientated 
on a potentially more dynamic unofficial/official interplay. 
 
Solidarity Generated 
The enormous extent of the British labour movement’s solidarity for the Dublin workers was 
expressed in a variety of ways. To begin with, there was the sheer level of financial 
assistance generated by the TUC and its affiliated unions, which apart from being of 
considerable moral comfort, was undoubtedly crucial in allowing the ITGWU to continue to 
fight over the long months of the Lockout. According to one estimate4 the British labour 
movement raised around £150,000, in today’s money that would be worth over £11 million.  
5 
 
Most funding was donations from the TUC and its affiliated unions. The Miners’ 
Federation of Great Britain annual conference agreed to contribute £1,000 a week, in total 
donating some £14,000, with additional donations from many local miners’ associations in 
Nottinghamshire, Wales and Scotland. The Amalgamated Society of Engineers donated 
nearly £4,000 and the National Union of Teachers contributed £1,000, with a great many 
other unions making single donations of £200-800. The Sheet Metal Workers’ Union 
imposed a two-shilling levy on members and the Co-operative Baking Society of Glasgow 
donated 900 loaves a week. The Merseyside Quay and Railway Carters’ Union – an 
organisation composed primarily of Liverpool Protestant workers in a city marked by 
sectarian divide – donated £500. In addition, trades councils and local union branches 
helped organise meetings and collections, with the London Trades Council donating £573 
and Manchester and Salford Trades Council contributing £205. There were also generous 
financial donations made by the various different political strands within the British labour 
movement, such as the Independent Labour Party (ILP), the co-operative movement, and 
small societies, with the radical left press, in particular the Daily Herald, also raising 
substantial sums (albeit the newly formed Labour Party only managed to raise £513). In 
addition, money was raised at general solidarity meetings and rallies and street collections, 
and by individual donations.5 
There was also numerous specially chartered food ships (notably the SS Hare) that 
were sent to the Dublin strikers in very public displays of support organised under the 
auspices of the TUC. The ships contained thousands of packages of food, with crates of jam, 
tea, butter, margarine and groceries that were made up into ‘family boxes’. By the time the 
Lockout had come to an end, the food ships had carried 1,797,699 loaves of bread, 689,166 
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10lb bags of potatoes, 472,966 packets of margarine, 480,306 packets of tea, 461,530 
packets of sugar, 72,830 jars of jam, 12,500 packets of cheese, 2,400 cans of condensed 
milk, and 884 tons of coal.6 
The enthusiastic response to solidarity appeals for the Dublin workers was evidenced 
by the huge attendances at many public rallies held across the country which Larkin 
addressed as part of a ‘Fiery Cross’ propaganda crusade organised by an amalgam of radical 
left groups, including Daily Herald Leagues and Clarion Clubs. At the Free Trade Hall in 
Manchester there were 4,000 present, with upwards of 20,000 thronging the streets 
outside.7 Two huge meetings were held at the Royal Albert Hall in London, both of which 
were filled to capacity with 10,000 and another 10,000 gathered outside. Other meetings 
were held in Sheffield (2,000), Bristol (4,000), Glasgow (4,000), Edinburgh (7,000), as well as 
in numerous other towns and cities. In Manchester it was reported ‘the appearance of Mr 
Larkin on the platform gave rise to a remarkable demonstration. The whole audience as one 
mass leapt to their feet and stood cheering and shouting “Hurrah” for some minutes’.8 
According to The Times9 the meeting in Bristol carried a resolution supporting the Dublin 
workers in their struggle against employers’ attempts to crush trade unionism and 
denounced the London-based Liberal government for ‘allowing its forces to be ruthlessly 
used to kill, bludgeon and imprison the workers in the interests of the scoundrelly minions 
of capitalism'. 
Larkin’s arrest and seven months’ imprisonment for ‘seditious libel’ also provoked 
widespread grassroots protests. An Albert Hall rally in London pledged to attend the 
meetings of every Liberal minister and heckle incessantly until he was released, and to 
campaign against the Liberals at three pending parliamentary by-elections. As a result, after 
7 
 
just 17 days, and combined with the impact of rioting in Dublin, the government ordered 
Larkin’s release. It was an unprecedented victory which helped to identify Larkin ever more 
closely with the Irish struggle and underlined the level of support for the Dublin workers. As 
the Daily Herald editorialised: ‘At this stage more than ever the rank-and-file are the 
determining factor in the situation. They have brought about the release of Larkin and on 
them devolves the work of following up the victory…The spirit of the rank-and-file has been 
stirred to an unprecedented degree. The evidence on that point is striking’.10 
At the same time there was the so-called ‘Kiddies Scheme’ devised by the socialist-
feminist Dora Montefiore in association with a group of suffragettes connected with the 
Daily Herald League in London, which aimed at alleviating distress by sending some of the 
Dublin strikers’ children to stay with sympathetic families in England for the duration of the 
dispute. The scheme was modelled on the successful children’s holiday organised by the 
Industrial Workers of the World during the 1912 Lawrence strike in the United States, albeit 
in Ireland the plan was short-circuited in the face of full-blown opposition mounted by the 
Catholic Church. 
Most significantly, there were two bouts of rank-and-file unofficial sympathetic 
action by railway workers across the country. The first wave took place between 15-23 
September, when the suspension of three workers at Victoria Station in Liverpool who had 
followed Larkin’s appeal for the and boycott of Dublin exports, prompted some 3,000 
railwaymen across the north west to walk out on unofficial strike, with disquiet at bonus 
payments in some goods yards also underlying the dispute. The strike spread to 5,500 other 
railway workers in Birmingham, Crewe, Derby, Sheffield, Gloucester, Nottingham and Leeds 
– unofficial action organised by local rank-and-file ‘Vigilance’ committees who campaigned 
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for a national stoppage in solidarity with the ITGWU in Dublin and in support of railway 
workers’ own grievances).11  
The second wave of unofficial action by railwaymen in November occurred in the 
wake of Larkin’s ‘fiery cross’ campaign, when two South Wales malgamated Society of 
Locomotive Engineers and Fireman (ASLEF) union train drivers employed by the Great 
Western Railway were sacked for refusing to run trains with coal bound for Dublin’, and 
some 30,000 railwaymen (both ASLEF and NUR members, with goods porters striking 
alongside craft-minded drivers) took unofficial strike action to reverse their dismissals. 
Although not specifically over the Irish question the Irish dimension provided an important 
strand of discontent, with footplate staff also aggrieved over the demands for an 8-hour day 
over which a strike had been deferred just a few days earlier (Manchester Guardian, 24 
November; 3 December, 1913).12  
There was also solidarity action taken by some dockers in Liverpool and Salford. 
Sympathetic strikes took place in the Canada and Alexandra docks in north Liverpool against 
Irish firms that were importing strikebreakers. At the Pomona Docks in Salford, dockers on 
strike over union recognition agreed to suspend their dispute and unload a Guinness stout 
consignment on the ship SS Hare which had just arrived from Dublin, provided it also took 
back the food packages for the city’s locked out workers.13   
It was the extent and depth of the British labour movement’s solidarity for the 
Dublin dispute, combined with Larkin’s campaign for sympathetic industrial action, which 
secured the unprecedented agreement of the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC to call a 
special conference (held in December 1913 following its annual congress earlier in 
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September) to consider the British trade unions’ support for the Dublin dispute.This was the 
only occasion that such a conference had occurred since the founding of the TUC in 1868. 
In sum, the support generated in Britain for the Dublin strikers represented a potent 
symbol of international solidarity. James Connolly, who had returned to Dublin from the 
United States to join Larkin as the Belfast organiser of the ITGWU, praised the trade union 
rank-and-file of Britain: ‘I say in all solemnity and seriousness that in its attitude towards 
Dublin, the Working Class Movement of Great Britain reached its highest point of grandeur 
– attained for a moment to a realisation of that sublime unity towards which the best of us 
must continually aspire’.14 
  
Factors Explaining the Extent of Solidarity 
There are a variety of factors that help to explain the extent of British labour movement 
support. The extensive coverage in the British press and cinema newsreels of the dispute 
and the event of ‘Bloody Sunday’ (when police drew batons on demonstrators and badly 
injured 300 people) aroused public consciousness and support among British workers who 
were made aware of the Dublin employers’ aggressive tactics and the burden of the 
Lockout, on already poverty-stricken women and children.  
Meanwhile TUC and affiliated unions’ support for the Dublin workers also 
encouraged a widespread appreciation of the generalised threat to trade unionism and the 
right to organise. Such official union support came not merely from left-wing union leaders 
such as Ben Tillett (London-based Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Labourers’ Union), 
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Bob Smillie (Miners’ Federation) and Robert Williams (National Transport Workers’ 
Federation), but also more moderate figures such as James Seddon (chairman of the TUC 
Parliamentary Committee) and Harry Gosling (chairman of the National Transport Workers’ 
Federation) who accompanied the TUC food ships to Dublin. A notable focus of support for 
the Dublin workers was provided by the National Transport Workers’ Federation, which 
brought together 16 unions catering for dockers, seamen and carters, and had played a key 
co-ordinating role in the London dock strike of 1912.  
At the same time Larkin’s ‘Fiery Cross’ propaganda crusade, at which his flamboyant 
personality and ‘oratorical and rhetorical magic’ were displayed, met with an enthusiastic 
response that ‘astounded most observers and alarmed many’.15 Jack Murphy, the syndicalist 
Sheffield-based engineering union activist, who went on to become one of the leaders of 
the First World War shop stewards’ movement, heard Larkin speak and recalled his impact:  
Six-foot Jim Larkin, with his powerful, torrentially passionate eloquence swept the audience off its 
feet…I had never heard an orator of this calibre before, not seen an audience so roused to 
demonstrative enthusiasm…Here was the fighting leader, bearing in his person all the marks of battle, 
who would storm hell itself.16  
Likewise the Manchester Guardian reported:  
Even the most convinced and implacable opponent, if he is honest, must admit that he is a man to be 
reckoned with – must admit, too, that a personal influence so extraordinary must be backed by a 
cause or a principle that deeply moves his fellow-countrymen.17  
It was not inconsequential that many sympathisers had strong Irish family 
connections, notably in Lancashire generally and Liverpool specifically – in the latter Larkin 
11 
 
claimed 7 out of 10 people in Liverpool were a ‘great part’ Irish ‘either by birth or blood’.18 
Certainly the 7,000 carters in Liverpool had a close relationship with the North of Ireland 
and the much larger number of dockers was correspondingly identified with the South.19 In 
addition, Larkin was himself from Liverpool, and had worked for some time on the docks in 
the city and as an organiser for the (Liverpool-based) National Union of Dock Labourers; and 
both Larkin and James Connolly, although Irish-based militants visited Liverpool on several 
occasions.20  
The level of solidarity demonstrated previously by the ITGWU for British trade 
unionists also helps to explain the extent of support subsequently around the Dublin 
lockout. Significantly, not only had the ITGWU applied the doctrine of the sympathy strike 
within Ireland as a means of extracting concessions from employers for its own members, it 
had also responded to calls for solidarity action from British unions, and in doing so brought 
Larkin’s organisation to the attention of many British workers even before the Lockout. For 
example, during the 1911 seaman’s strike the ITGWU had gone to the rescue of the National 
Seamen’s and Firemen’s Union (NSFU), with every ship putting into the port of Dublin held 
up by ITGWU dockers until its crew joined the union and signed up to union conditions and 
rates of pay.21 Likewise, during the course of the 1911 Liverpool general transport strike, the 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (ASRS) had called a national strike which spilled 
over the Irish Sea when Irish railwaymen stopped in their support; the ITGWU, acting as the 
ASRS’s agent in Ireland, paid the railwaymen’s strike pay and refused to handle ‘blacked’ 
goods. It is against this backcloth that many British union activists wanted to reciprocate; 
certainly the £500 donated to the ITGWU by the Mersey Quay and Railway Carters’ Union, 
an organisation composed primarily of Liverpool Protestant workers in a city all too familiar 
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with religious sectarian divisions with Catholics, underlined the extent of solidarity that 
could be tapped, and despite Larkin’s own Catholic leanings.22 
There was also the broader context of the ‘Labour Unrest’ that had swept Britain 
from 1910, an unprecedented period of labour militancy with national strikes by dockers, 
seamen, miners, railway workers and many others, often involving unskilled, non-unionised 
workers.23 In each of the years 1910, 1911 and 1913 there were around 10 million days lost 
due to stoppages, and in 1912 (with the national miners’ strike) the figure was nearly 41 
million. During the four years 1910-1914 somewhere between 25-30 per cent of the British 
workforce went on strike, and more than 85 per cent of those who went on strike were 
victorious to some degree or another, underlining the way (despite the dramatic reversal of 
fortune in some individual battles) there was a spectacular growth in the total power of 
organised labour.24 Trade union organisation in Britain was completely transformed by this 
militancy with an increase in union membership from 2.4 million at the end of 1909 to 4.1 
million by the end of 1913. It is against this backcloth of an assertive and growing trade 
union movement that the high level of solidarity for the Dublin dispute can be understood. 
One of the most striking features of this labour militancy was its predominately 
unofficial character with strikers often clashing with full-time trade union officials. The 
perceived incorporation of such officials within formalised collective bargaining and 
conciliation machinery, and their reluctance to call strike action or even support disputes in 
which their members became involved, on the basis that this might jeopardise bargaining 
relations with employers, resulted in them being viewed with hostility by a wide layer of 
union members, with much strike activity displaying an unofficial character. As George 
Askwith, the Board of Trade’s chief industrial commissioner, commented: ’Official leaders 
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could not maintain their authority. Often there was more difference between the men and 
their leaders than between the latter and the employers’.25 For example, an unofficial 
momentum was central to the 1910 South Wales miners’ strike, 1911 national railway, 
shipping and docks strikes, and the 1912 London docks strike. According to Jack Murphy ‘to 
be “agin” the officials was as much a part of the nature of the syndicalist-mined workers of 
that time as to be “agin the Government” was a part of the nature of an Irishman’.26 
Moreover, as Cronin has noted: ‘the fundamental strategic innovation of 1910-1914 was the 
“sympathetic strike”’, often used to extend the field of combat and transform sectional 
demands into broader ones.27 Clearly such an unofficial and solidaristic dynamic to the 
industrial unrest of the period helps explain the willingness of rank-and-file union members 
on the railways and docks to take unofficial action in support of the Dublin dispute, and for 
many others to be critical of trade union leader’s refusal to mobilise wider sympathetic 
industrial action. 
Another important factor was the way in which the widespread industrial unrest 
contributed to an implicit questioning of, and challenge to, the existing political system in 
Edwardian Britain, even if the attempt by historians like Halévy and Dangerfield to suggest it 
destroyed the liberal values on which British society had rested since the early part of the 
20th century exaggerates the process.28 By contrast, the claim by Keogh and Pelling that the 
struggles were only really significant in terms of securing limited immediate improvements 
in wages and conditions and the right to union organisation, and demonstrated only trade 
union consciousness on the part of workers with no significant section of the working class 
politicised, is arguably flawed.29 In pursuing demands over terms and conditions of 
employment and union recognition, workers were often confronted with not only hesitant 
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labour movement leaders but also intransigent employers and hostile government officials, 
the defiance of magistrates, and persistent violent clashes with police and troops (deployed 
in many disputes to protect ‘blackleg’ labour and/or undermine picketing). Meanwhile many 
workers had clearly become disaffected with parliamentary politics caused by the 
functioning of the Labour Party effectively acting as a mere adjunct of the post 1906 Liberal 
Party government. As a result, the established ‘rules of the game’ – piecemeal social reform 
by means of institutionalised collective bargaining and parliamentary action – was put under 
considerable strain. The realisation that strike action could win major concessions from 
employers reinforced the appeal of direct action as a weapon, and the willingness of 
different sections of workers to take sympathy industrial action with others involved in 
industrial disputes, exemplified by the Dublin Lockout, encouraged not only a broad 
awareness of class solidarity but also the development of a sense of class consciousness 
amongst at least a sizeable minority of workers.30 
Against this backcloth the ideological and organisational influence of the radical left 
was also critical. While members of the two Marxist organisations, the British Socialist Party 
and Socialist Labour Party, mobilised support for the Dublin dispute, a more important 
solidarity role was played by syndicalists grouped around Tom Mann’s Industrial Syndicalist 
Education League and the Unofficial Reform Committee of the South Wales Miners’ 
Federation, as well associated unofficial rank-and-file amalgamation movements on the 
railways and in the engineering, transport and building industries, all of whom criticised the 
timidity of union officialdom and advocated militant unofficial ‘direct action’ and industrial 
unionism of the kind represented by the ITGWU.31 
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Clegg, Pelling and Laybourn,32 have suggested British syndicalism’s role within the 
labour unrest was not particularly significant, while Hobsbawm asserted ‘its influence was 
almost certainly much smaller than enthusiastic historians of the left have sometimes 
supposed’.33 Of course, it is true there were probably no more than a few thousand 
members of the ISEL at any one time, and sales of the paper The Syndicalist only reached a 
peak of about 20,000 readers, albeit syndicalist support for Larkinite conceptions of militant 
industrial unionism as a weapon for the assertion of working class economic power was also 
scattered among a range of activists in organisations such as the Plebs League and Central 
Labour College, and the Daily Herald which had a readership of between 50,000 to 150,000. 
But the size and scope of the labour unrest undoubtedly provided a highly favourable 
context for syndicalist ideas to be broadcast, grievances identified, and workers persuaded 
that strike action that bypassed the perceived ‘class collaboration’ of official union leaders 
was the logical means to seek redress to both employers’ pressure and state repression, and 
for syndicalists like Mann and others to assume leadership of strikes out of proportion to 
their formal numerical strength, notably in the 1910 South Wales Cambrian Combine 
dispute, 1911 Liverpool general transport strike, and 1914 London building workers’ 
lockout.34  
It was these working-class agitators and propagandists, who had played a key role in 
generating support for militant trade unionism and solidarity action generally, that were 
also now important in building support for the Lockout and encouraging a mood of 
sympathy for the aggressive syndicalist aims of the ITGWU.  
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Larkin’s Appeal for Sympathetic Industrial Action 
We can now turn attention to Larkin’s strategy to win the dispute: the call for sympathetic 
industrial action by the British labour movement. In light of the outright refusal of the 
Dublin employers to agree to any compromise settlement of the dispute (on the basis of 
seeking not merely the defeat but the destruction of the ITGWU and ‘Larkinism’), and with 
shipping employers importing large numbers of strike-breakers (many of them from Britain) 
into Dublin to keep the port open, the ITGWU was confronted with a battle for its very 
existence, and it became clear that financial and food assistance from the TUC, no matter 
how generous, was going to win the dispute. Hence the ITGWU, Larkin argued, needed 
urgent solidarity industrial action in Britain. While the Daily Herald propagandised in favour 
of ‘a general strike’ in support of the Dublin workers, Larkin appealed more feasibly for 
solidarity ‘blacking’ action to secure the boycott of all goods in transit to Dublin or ‘tainted 
goods’ from Dublin that had been handled by imported scabs to break the strike. 
From 1911 Larkin’s syndicalist-inspired approach to trade unionism exemplified by 
the principle of working class solidarity via the sympathetic strike had become absolutely 
central to the ITGWU’s body politic. As James Connolly wrote: ‘The sympathetic strike is the 
recognition by the working class of their essential unity, the manifestation in our daily 
industrial relations that our brother’s fight is our fight, that our sisters’ troubles are our 
troubles, that we are all members one of another’.35 In the face of the Lockout and the 
attempt by employers to deny workers the right to organise, Larkin’s call to ‘black’ Dublin 
goods was viewed as the most effective way to prevent the importation of non-union labour 
into Dublin, break the employers’ solidarity, and force individual companies to settle on 
terms dictated by the union. Thus Larkin’s crusade of meetings across Britain was used to 
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attempt to secure such solidarity, notably from seamen, dockers, railwaymen and transport 
workers: ‘We say all your money is useful, but money never won a strike. Money can’t win a 
strike. Discipline, solidarity, knowledge of the position and the strength to carry out your 
will – these are the things’.36  
In the process of appealing for British labour movement support, Larkin 
controversially castigated in a directly personalised fashion individual TUC and Labour Party 
leaders for their failure to agree to support the call for sympathetic industrial action. Even 
after the TUC agreed to call a special conference he appealed directly to the rank-and-file to 
bring their recalcitrant leaders to heel: ‘Comrades in the British Labour movement. Your 
leaders suggest…that you…are prepared to back up your sympathy only in word and money 
value, but not in deeds. If that was correct one might feel dispirited’. He warned that union 
leaders were preparing a settlement of the Lockout inimical to trade union principles:  
Tell your leaders now and every day until December 9th, and raise your voice upon that date to tell 
them that they are not there as apologists for the shortcomings of the Capitalist system, that they are 
not there to assist the employers in helping defeat any action of workers striving to live, nor to act as 
a brake on the wheel of progress.37 
Larkin lambasted a number of individual trade union leaders for their refusal to 
support sympathetic industrial action. He called Jimmy Thomas (National Union of 
Railwaymen) ‘a double-dyed traitor to his class’ and accused Havelock Wilson (National 
Sailors’ and Firemen’s’ Union) of actively assisting the Shipping Federation in pouring in 
strikebreakers to keep the Dublin port open. Wilson and Thomas were union leaders who 
had ‘neither a soul to be saved nor a body to be kicked’. Likewise, in referring to Wilson and 
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others, Larkin said: ‘I am not going to allow these serpents to raise their foul heads and spit 
out their poison any longer’.38 
At the time such a critique was condemned by the TUC’s Daily Citizen on the basis 
that it ‘does no service to his cause, or to the cause of labour, by sowing distrust between 
leaders and followers’. Likewise for most labour historians39 Larkin’s abuse of the British 
trade union leaders usually figures as one of the principal criticisms of the conduct of the 
dispute; it was a ‘fatal mistake’ that gratuitously and needlessly antagonised union officials 
and merely provided ammunition to his enemies.40 Some have argued that Larkin’s 
behaviour in literally ‘biting the hand that was feeding him’ is to be explained 
psychologically in terms of Larkin’s alleged ‘personality dysfunction’ and ‘egotism’.41  
Yet it is important to bear in mind that Larkin’s attacks primarily reflected his own 
direct personal experience (as well as embrace of the general syndicalist analysis of) the 
limitations of trade union officialdom as being synonymous with compromise, betrayal and 
defeat. It was as a full-time organiser for the Liverpool-based National Union of Dock 
Labourers (NUDL) across ports in Ireland between 1907-8, successfully organising a series of 
strikes (notably by 2,500 Belfast dockers, carters and coal labourers), that Larkin’s militant 
approach had brought him into conflict with the moderate leadership of general secretary 
James Sexton and his expulsion from the union, leading as a direct consequence to the 
formation of the ITGWU in December 1908. Such experience led him to be under no illusion 
that Sexton would be prepared to offer Dublin workers sympathetic industrial action, unless 
forced to do so by union members from below.  
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Meanwhile during the Lockout Larkin observed the way that Jimmy Thomas had not 
only refused to support the unofficial railway workers’ strikes in support of Dublin, but had 
instructed his striking members back to work. Likewise Larkin was aware of the way British 
union officials effectively assisted the Dublin employers’ strikebreaking initiatives, with 
cargo placed by members of Sexton’s NUDL on board ships manned by Wilson’s National 
Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union, and then discharged in Liverpool by NUDL members. From 
Larkin’s perspective, Thomas, Sexton, Wilson and others were betraying the Dublin workers 
irrespective of any biting critique he might make. Likewise Larkin’s caustic remarks about 
the Labour Party leadership were a reflection of their emphatic opposition to the call for 
sympathetic industrial action, with Ramsey MacDonald (chair of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party) denouncing the union’s key strategy: ‘The sympathetic strike is poor fighting. It 
demoralises Trade Unionism, weakens collective action and produces reactionary prejudice 
in the public mind’.42 
More generally, Larkin was well aware of the way that during the labour unrest that 
had swept Britain one group of workers after another had clashed with their own trade 
union officials who had attempted to dampen down militancy in ways that were perceived 
to be detrimental to rank-and-file interests and aspirations. It was in this context that Larkin 
took the view that British labour movement leaders were an obstacle to his appeal for 
solidarity industrial action - why should officials who had betrayed their own members 
behave any better when it came to supporting the members of another union, and an Irish 
union at that? So from the very beginning Larkin attempted to raise the demand for rank-
and-file solidarity that it was hoped would push a reluctant and untrustworthy official union 
leadership into action. As we shall see, Larkin’s appeal met with a favourable (albeit 
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minority) response and arguably the main obstacle to solidarity action with the Dublin 
workers was not lack of sympathy among key groups of workers, but the opposition of the 
official trade union leadership.  
Yet if the sharp criticism of union officials was understandable there was a question 
mark over what was the best way to encourage rank-and-file action that might have helped 
to force the hand of the officials and the TUC. Significantly there is no evidence of Larkin’s 
call for sympathetic industrial action being anchored around targeted strategic groups of 
workers employed in industries involved in business with Dublin with the aim of devising an 
appropriate plans of action that could have linked to workers’ own specific and immediate 
self-interested grievances on pay, conditions and union organisation. The railwaymen would 
have been particularly important in this respect (not least because the NUR also had 
members across Ireland), as would have been docks and shipping workers employed by 
railway companies on Irish Sea crossings. Meanwhile although some prominent full-time 
officials and senior lay officers of the British unions, including dockers’ union leader Ben 
Tillett (who joined Larkin on the platform of his ‘Fiery Cross’ mass rallies), Robert Williams 
(National Transport Workers’ Federation), Jack Jones (Gasworkers’ and General Labourers’ 
Union), and Robert Smillie (Scottish miners), all supported Larkin’s strategy of calling for a 
boycott of Dublin traffic, there was no organised and systematic attempt made to forge links 
between rank-and-file activists and left-wing union officials to build national networks of 
solidarity across the unions that might have encouraged greater leverage on the TUC to act. 
This raises the question: was there any serious prospect of such sympathetic 
industrial action gaining traction? Yeates has argued the notion of such action in Britain in 
support of the ITWU was utopian, ignoring the ‘underlying realities’ that ‘many British 
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unions were still recovering from three years of almost constant strikes between 1909 and 
1912 that had left them weakened and, in some cases, nearly bankrupt’.43 Likewise, 
Williams has claimed that ‘British railway and transport workers, hardly recovered from 
their own recent struggles, were in no position to undertake any such commitment’.44  
 
Potential  
Although the number of workers involved in strikes during 1913 was less than it had been in 
1911 and 1912 it was still very high at 689,000, and there was the largest number (1,497) of 
individual strikes recorded.45 The scale of rank-and-file railway workers’ militancy during this 
period was demonstrated in 1911 with unofficial action in Liverpool, Manchester and 
Sheffield forcing union officials’ into calling the first ever national railway strike of over 
145,000 workers over the central demands for union recognition and an end to the 
unsatisfactory conciliation procedures established four years earlier. The strike resulted in 
the rapid growth of the railway unions and a new confidence among railwaymen.46 After the 
strike persistent workers’ discontent in 1912-13 manifested itself in a series of local 
unofficial disputes across the country over both immediate conditions and union 
recognition that further underlined the continuing gap between rank-and-file members and 
union officials.47 In London in August 1913 at a mass rally to celebrate the second 
anniversary of the 1911 strike, some 20,000 listened to a platform of unofficial speakers 
calling for a higher minimum wage and an 8-hour day, with several speakers declaring ‘that 
it was no use relying on Unity House [union headquarters] – the men had to fight for 
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themselves’.48 In Doncaster Jimmy Thomas was shouted down for his defence of conciliation 
procedures.49  
In all this continuing railway unrest the influence of syndicalist ideas via leading 
militants such as Charles Watkins and George Brown and The Syndicalist Railwayman 
newspaper played an influential role.50 Indeed in his history of the NUR, Bagwell writes of 
this period that ‘it became more difficult for its full-time officers to keep fully in touch with 
opinion in the branches where the membership was increasingly influenced by syndicalist 
doctrines’; the railwaymen ‘were less prepared to tolerate the abuses of officialdom’.51  
With the outbreak of the Dublin Lockout, and following Larkin arrest and 
imprisonment, more than 300 NUR branches, representing some 85,000 members, passed a 
vote of no confidence in their leaders for tolerating ‘blacklegging’ and calling for a national 
strike in solidarity with the Dublin dispute.52 In the process, there was the possibility of 
linking the railwaymen’s own outstanding grievances with the growing demands for 
solidarity with the ITGWU. The Daily Herald quoted a member of the NUR’s London District 
Council: ‘I have never seen enthusiasm as there is among our men in the London branches. 
They are ready for anything in the way of sympathetic action’; the only obstacle was the 
union leadership, but he thought it likely that ‘the whole of our forces’ will be ‘ranged 
behind the men of Dublin before many days are over’.53 
There was also a considerable amount of willingness to take sympathetic industrial 
action by dockers in different parts of the country, despite the fact they had engaged in a 
national strike in 1911, and London dockers had again been on strike in 1912 and sustained 
a crushing defeat. A leading London docks (NUDL) union official reported that: 
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In all my experience I have never known a time when there has been manifested such a desire to help 
any union in dispute as there is among dockers both in London and the provincial ports towards their 
Dublin comrades. We have had to rearrange the whole of our paid officials in London, placing them in 
certain centres with the express purpose of preventing any disorganised move…It has been with the 
greatest trouble – and some of us have received rather strong words – that we have so far been able 
to hold the men in check.54 
Likewise some other unions expressed a willingness to take sympathetic industrial 
action with Dublin. For example, at the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain annual 
conference delegates supported a proposal to approach all transport unions with the aim of 
co-ordinating a general strike. At the TUC annual conference held in September there had 
been substantial disquiet at the Dublin events, further reflected in many resolutions of 
protest to the TUC from trades councils and union branches. The subsequent 
unprecedented decision by the TUC to call a special conference in November, and the 
numerous resolutions sent to it from union branches calling for consideration of a general 
‘down-tools’ policy,55 was a graphic indication of the extent of the solidarity pressure 
building up from below.  
Meanwhile the growth of the idea of sympathetic industrial action as the means to 
leverage greater pressure on employers, and its widespread popularity among many rank-
and-file union activists, was highlighted by the way it became a powerful embedded 
interdependent factor in the success of shipping, transport, railway and miners’ strikes 
between 1911 and 1912. This was most graphically displayed in the 1911 Liverpool general 
transport strike, with an unprecedented level of solidarity strike action taken by a wide 
variety of different transport workers (including seamen, railway workers, carters, 
tramwaymen, tugboatmen and dockers) who then took the opportunity to draw up their 
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own programme of demands. The strikes climaxed in a general strike of 66,000 workers 
which lasted for 12 days, paralysing commercial activity across the city and compelling the 
employers to make enormous concessions on pay, working conditions and union 
recognition.56 Tom Mann commented: ‘Solidarity had truly worked wonders’.57  
There was the also the general appeal of industrial unionism and industrial solidarity 
more broadly (as advocated by the syndicalists and others) as the means to overcome the 
sectionalism and fragmentation of craft unions, contributing to the establishment of the 
National Transport Workers’ Federation (NTWF) and National Union of Railwaymen (NUR). 
The growing rank-and-file interest in industrial unity that had developed in 1911 and 1912 
encouraged the progress of official union negotiations during 1913-13 towards a permanent 
body linking some 1.5 million transport workers, railwaymen and miners in the form of a 
‘Triple Alliance’ that could provide for the co-ordination of strike action between its 
constituent unions. 
In sum, against the backcloth of a wide-scale labour unrest over the previous 2-3 
years and continuing considerable unrest on the docks, railways and elsewhere, and in a 
context in which an underlying general feature of such unrest was its unofficial character, 
there was clearly some potential for the call for sympathetic industrial action over the 
Dublin Lockout to win widespread support. But there were also considerable obstacles to 
such a development that need to be considered. 
 
Limitations 
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Although there was a higher number of disputes in 1913 than in the previous year, the 
number of strikers involved was less than in both previous years and the number of working 
days lost also fell commensurately in both years, plus there was less overt national conflict 
compared to 1911-1912.58 Meanwhile there were tremendous difficulties in attempting to 
convince workers who might have felt they had no direct interest in the Dublin dispute that 
they should refuse to do certain kinds of work in order to help fellow trade unionists. Such 
difficulties were compounded where it threatened victimisation and the threat of loss of 
permanent employment. Some activists unable to generate action on their own domestic 
issues may have felt reluctant to fight over the concerns of workers elsewhere, however 
sympathetic they may have been to Dublin. Another obstacle to solidarity industrial action 
for the Dublin dispute was the fact the 1912 London transport strike had been decisively 
defeated in a dispute that had been effectively restricted to the capital, with the failure of 
the National Transport Workers’ Federation to secure sympathetic strike action from its 
members in most other ports across the country. It should also be noted that the numbers 
calling for sympathetic industrial action with Dublin was only a small (if not insignificant) 
minority of the labour movement, with the most embedded level of support generated in 
those areas, such as Liverpool, Bristol and south Wales,59 where the syndicalist movement 
had its greatest influence.   
Beyond such factors most union leaders were emphatically opposed to the use of 
the sympathetic strike being advocated by militants within their ranks and did what they 
could to stymie such a development. Thomas, Sexton, and Wilson viewed spasmodic 
unofficial stoppages as undesirable because they were viewed as undermining their 
credibility with employers with whom they had struck agreements on behalf of their 
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members; and they regarded sympathy strikes with particular disfavour on the basis that 
their priority was looking after their own members’ interests, not the interests of members 
of other unions. In the light of the fact they had experienced tough battles with advocates of 
militant rank-and-file action inside their own unions, the Dublin dispute ran the risk of 
merely increasing such pressures with Larkin as the hero of such radicals. 
The railways provided a vivid illustration of the problem. During the lockout, Jimmy 
Thomas, who was still seeking full recognition for his newly amalgamated union, the 
National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), and faced with the first wave of unofficial strike 
action, directly intervened in union districts in the North, the Midlands, the West and Wales 
to assert his authority and denounce sympathetic strike action as ‘ruinous’.60 The NUR 
executive issued a manifesto denying that traffic from Dublin was ‘blackleg traffic’ and 
claimed that ITGWU members loaded it. NUR officials were sent to Liverpool and 
Birmingham to instruct their members to work their ‘ordinary duties’. In the absence of 
official support, and widespread sympathy action elsewhere, the strikers were eventually 
persuaded to return to work.61  
Likewise Thomas intervened to end the second wave of unofficial railwaymen’s 
strikes in South Wales, effectively smashing the strike by instructing NUR members to do the 
work of the two victimised ASLEF members whom he described as ‘a disgrace to the trade 
union movement’.62 As the NUR’s semi-official historian put it: ‘Mr J. H. Thomas went down 
and turned the table on the malcontents’.63 This setback for a militant (and syndicalist-
influenced) section of workers, coming as it did three days before the TUC delegates met in 
London to formally consider the dispute, considerably undermined the momentum for 
sympathetic action.  
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Other union leaders matched this opposition to solidarity action for Dublin workers, 
with James Sexton of the NUDL deploying officials in all the ports where it had members to 
discourage unofficial walkouts. Likewise the seamen’s union leader Havelock Wilson publicly 
attacked ‘Larkinism’, despite the fact it had been the ITGWU that had assisted Wilson’s 
union in their 1911 strike. And even Robert Williams (secretary of the National Transport 
Workers’ Federation) who who had shared a ‘Fiery Cross’ platform with Larkin and appeared 
wholeheartedly committed to the cause of the Dublin workers, had second thoughts about 
his earlier call for a boycott of Dublin on the basis of misplaced confidence that the TUC 
special conference would take action to support the ITGWU. 
 In the meantime, even though on the face of it the Triple Alliance amounted to a 
significant step towards industrial unionism, for many trade union officials involved it was 
not seen as a means of promoting class unity through sympathetic strike action, still less a 
revolutionary weapon to overthrow capitalism as the syndicalists advocated. Rather it was 
seen merely as a means of equipping themselves with greater bargaining leverage whereby 
mere threats of strike action could force employers to make concessions and the 
government to intervene, thereby preventing or reducing spontaneous unofficial outbursts 
of rank-and-file militancy and sympathetic action.64 In practice, the existence of a union 
officialdom that acted as a brake on membership militancy was a more fundamental 
problem than sectionalism or the problems of union structure on which the syndicalists 
concentrated their attention.65  
Crucially the rank-and-file unofficial action taken by railway workers in support of 
the Dublin dispute was too limited and isolated to be an effective counterweight to the 
determination of the union officials. And even where other union members expressed a 
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willingness to take action, they lacked the confidence to do so independently of their own 
union officials, and instead awaited official direction and a lead from the TUC. There was an 
insufficient level of rank-and-file cross-industry organisation that could initiative and co-
ordinate action from below across the trade union movement. This was compounded by the 
fact that the syndicalist and socialist left were not well organised in mobilising across 
industries to overcome the officials’ dead hand and proved unable to mobilise broader 
unofficial solidarity action for Dublin. When Tom Mann went away to America in August 
1913 on an extended speaking tour during the critical early weeks of the Lockout, it meant 
the syndicalists lost a charismatic and influential agitator who straddled the 
official/unofficial union divide within the labour movement, and who might otherwise have 
played a pivotal role. The fragmentation and disintegration of the ISEL during the summer of 
1913 over strategic and organisational divisions further exacerbated the problem.  
Nonetheless, despite these weaknesses, if the TUC had issued a call for sympathetic 
industrial action, it seems reasonable to assume (albeit unknowable) it could have 
potentially transformed the situation - accentuating the positives and diminishing the 
negatives – by encouraging those rank-and-file activists who did not have the confidence 
and strength to deliver such action on their own but may have been prepared to take action 
if they had been given an official lead. 
 
TUC ‘Betrayal’ 
Despite calling an unprecedented special conference to consider the British trade unions’ 
continuing support for the Dublin dispute, the TUC ended up decisively voting against 
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sympathetic industrial action by a majority of 11-1, deploring and condemning the ‘unfair’ 
attacks upon British trade union officials, and expressing confidence in those who had been 
‘unjustly assailed’.66 As a result of this TUC decision the momentum for unofficial action was 
decisively crushed and the Dublin workers, left to struggle on isolated, eventually went 
down some weeks later to crushing defeat, with hundreds falling victim to the blacklist and 
those who retained their jobs only returning on humiliating terms. Although the ITGWU 
survived as an organisation, the movement of working class revolt in Ireland was decisively 
defeated (albeit wartime conditions were to allow a remarkable recovery from 1917-1923) 
and the tide of ‘Larkinism’ turned back. As James Connolly commented:  
We asked for the isolation of the capitalists of Dublin, and for answer the leaders of the British labour 
movement proceeded calmly to isolate the working class of Dublin…And so we Irish workers must go 
down into Hell, bow our backs to the lash of the slave drive…and eat the dust of defeat and 
betrayal.67  
More generally, the defeat of the Lockout was also a serious blow to the British 
labour movement, underlined by the subsequent building workers’ lockout of early 1914. 
Why did the TUC special conference refuse to mobilise sympathetic industrial action? 
In some respects this can be explained in terms of the nature of the organisation of the 
conference. Although Yeates has acknowledged TUC leaders ‘rigged the debate’, he argues 
that given Larkin’s ‘ferocious fiery cross campaign of the proceeding weeks, it is hard to 
blame them’.68 But in many respects the conference arrangements were stacked against 
Larkin’s position. None of the delegates were formally elected or mandated for the 
occasion, instead they were either appointed by their executives or chosen from the 
delegation who had previously been elected to the annual TUC some three months earlier, 
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with the result that they were not reflective of the growing clamour for solidarity action 
beyond funds and food that had gathered pace.69 In addition, delegates were only accepted 
from TUC affiliated unions, a decision which not only excluded the engineers’ union (which 
had not paid its dues that year) and the National Transport Workers’ Federation (which was 
not a trade union in its own right, even though it was composed of 29 unions that were 
affiliated to the TUC), but also many Irish trade unions. This meant the conference was 
‘largely made up of the obedient official element of their own stamp’, thereby enabling the 
TUC leadership to evade engagement with rank-and-file support for the Lockout (albeit it 
was largely the same composition as the September TUC conference that had been so 
supportive of the Dublin workers).70 
Did the TUC ‘betray’ the Dublin strikers? On the one hand, according to Yeates ‘there 
is no reason to doubt the good faith of the TUC’; ‘it is certainly a mistake to portray the 
TUC’s action as some sort of betrayal of the Dublin men’.71 The TUC’s Parliamentary 
Committee had no constitutional power to call for any kind of sympathetic industrial action 
in support of the Dublin workers (unlike in 1926 when the TUC General Council, which had 
replaced the Parliamentary Committee in 1921, called a General Strike in support of the 
miners’ union). In addition many TUC leaders felt that sympathetic action would be costly in 
terms of depleting unions’ strike funds, would disrupt existing bargaining arrangements with 
employers, open up the prospect of putting their unions into constant dispute, fritter away 
their members’ power fighting other workers’ battles without any real benefits to 
themselves, and anyway be ineffective compared to securing a compromise settlement with 
the Dublin employers. In addition, as we have seen, many officials were wary of unleashing 
rank-and-file membership militancy inside their own unions that they would be unable to 
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control (having barely kept control amidst the whirlwind of strikes since 1911), and of a 
victory for ‘Larkinism’ increasing support for the syndicalist objectives they were so opposed 
to.  
But arguably to understand what happened we also can draw on the sophisticated 
British syndicalist critique of official trade unionism, to which Larkin subscribed, and which 
located their alleged ‘betrayal’ in relation to their distinct social position. Thus the 
syndicalists highlighted the existence of a conservative social stratum of full-time union 
officials and the fundamental conflict of interest between the interests of this ‘bureaucracy’ 
and their rank-and-file members. They drew attention to the collaborationist logic of 
formalised collective bargaining and conciliation procedures that encouraged an attachment 
to the need for compromise in negotiations, the avoidance of strikes, and a commitment to 
the existing social and political order. It was for this reason that union officials acted as a 
brake on workers’ struggles, betrayed their members in strikes and prevented a decisive 
challenge to the employers and government.72  
Ironically it was Ben Tillett, one of the most prominent ‘left-wing’ leaders who had 
appeared on the platform alongside Larkin on a number of occasions during his ‘fiery cross’ 
campaign, who struck the fatal blow at the TUC special conference, proposing a motion 
condemning Larkin’s attacks on the leaders of the British trade union movement and 
thereby opening the floodgates for a score of attacks on Larkin from moderates like 
Thomas.  
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Yet notwithstanding its attempt to understand the limitations of trade-union 
officialdom and to suggest the practical means of overcoming its influence, Larkin and the 
syndicalist tradition were also confronted with some difficult dilemmas. 
 
Side-tracking of Larkin 
Newsinger73 has argued that following the 18 November announcement of a special TUC 
special conference to be held on 9 December, Larkin made a tactical error by not spending 
the next three weeks going over the officials’ heads to appeal directly for immediate 
unofficial rank-and-file industrial action from below to boycott Dublin traffic as a means of 
forcing the TUC’s hand ahead of the conference. From this somewhat counter-factual 
perspective, only if they had been confronted by a powerful unofficial movement spreading 
across the country, outside of their control and acting independently, would trade union 
officialdom have been under sufficient pressure that they felt it necessary, however 
reluctantly, to put themselves at the head of such a movement and give a lead from the 
front. Instead, Larkin was side-tracked into seeing the priority as calling on his supporters to 
regard the special conference as decisive, with all his energy and emphasis placed on 
encouraging the TUC to call official sympathetic action from above at some future date. In 
the event, not only were the TUC leaders not willing to undertake such a course of action, 
but they effectively saw the conference as a means of killing off unofficial action while 
preparing a compromise settlement of the Lockout.   
Although we can only speculate, it seems doubtful whether Newsinger’s alternative 
unofficial approach would have had - on its own at least - sufficient depth, scale and impact, 
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such that TUC leaders would have been ‘carried along by the momentum of the movement’ 
as he suggests. By contrast possibly a more appropriate roadmap might have been the 
adoption of neither pure ‘rank-and-filism’ nor a total reliance on official union action (with 
Larkin effectively switching from the former optimistic approach to the latter pessimistic 
one), but a more dynamic interplay between continuing to try to foster unofficial action 
from below, while seeking to forge concrete links with sympathetic prominent left-wing 
trade union officials, and utilising such official/unofficial networks as the means to 
encourage broader levels of official union support at the TUC conference. 
Certainly the attempt to obtain official endorsement from the TUC conference for 
the call for solidarity industrial action could be justified on the basis that official union 
backing, even if in practice it had subsequently only emanated from some strategically 
placed figures in a minority of unions and fell short of obtaining full TUC backing, could 
potentially have influenced a much wider layer of workers than Larkin’s appeal on its own 
was ever liable to have. In turn this might have then boosted the confidence of activists to 
mobilise and the willingness of the rank-and-file to respond. As the labour unrest had vividly 
demonstrated, although many union officials had often been opposed, or reluctant, to call 
strike action, the fact that they sometimes had was a reflection of the significant counter-
pressures to which they felt subject from their own union activists/members. In mobilising 
workers on occasions it then opened up possibilities for the rank-and-file to draw in much 
larger numbers and escalate the action outside of the officials’ control.74 But such a dynamic 
unofficial/official interplay was not to be realised in the Dublin Lockout. 
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Weaknesses of Rank-and-File and Socialist Organisation 
As will have become apparent, the lack of effective sympathetic industrial action for the 
Dublin strikers cannot entirely be put down to the limitations of trade union officialdom; 
there were also the weaknesses of rank-and-file and socialist organisation. Notwithstanding 
the enormous sympathy for Dublin workers inside the British labour movement and the 
willingness of a significant minority across the country to support Larkin’s call for solidarity 
industrial action, there was not sufficient levels and extent of confidence for the rank-and-
file to act en masse on their own. In this context it was understandable that militant activists 
tended to place their hopes in the official TUC leadership delivering action, despite the 
undeveloped official/unofficial networks that might have helped to facilitate this process.  
At the same time rank-and-file militancy and anger was neither organised nor 
provided with a political direction by the syndicalist and socialist militants within the 
movement in a fashion that might also have contributed to overcoming the hesitation or 
opposition of union officials. In a period when the Labour Party was a marginal force and 
was wracked by internal dissension, the labour unrest and trade union explosion provided 
some basis for a renewal of socialist politics beyond the merely parliamentary form, but this 
was not to occur. While there were important differences between the Independent Labour 
Party and British Socialist Party, what they had in common was a focus on parliamentary 
and local government elections which meant they were ill-fitted to respond to a strike wave 
whose very essence was extra-parliamentary. By contrast, while the Socialist Labour Party 
had a serious industrial orientation, it had little direct influence outside of Scotland and was 
severely handicapped by its sectarianism – with its advocacy of root-and-branch opposition 
to all existing unions and the construction of new revolutionary unions.75 
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Not surprisingly the failure of the socialist parties to find an adequate response to 
the labour unrest led an increasing number of industrial activists to abandon organised 
socialist politics for syndicalism. But notwithstanding its success in pulling together a 
network of militants across different industries, the ISEL was characterised by its 
decentralised, localised and diffuse nature; it had no organisation and leadership structure 
to speak of beyond Tom Mann and a few of his confidantes. In effect it existed to 
propagandise, to spread the ideas of syndicalism, but devoted comparatively few resources 
to attempting to organise their supporters, and by the autumn of 1913 and the Lockout 
bitter internal divisions had culminated in the rapid disintegration of the organisation.76  
Moreover the syndicalists were handicapped by their overall approach to the unions. 
They were confident it would be possible to transform the structures and procedures of 
union organisation (towards industrial unionism) as a means to wrest effective control away 
from bureaucratic officialdom and encourage unions to adopt revolutionary objectives. 
Emphasis was placed on rank-and-file democracy, decentralisation of union power and mass 
participation as the chief means by which the members could assert control over the official 
apparatus of the unions and direct it to their own ends. A militant rank-and-file, committed 
to direct action and grassroots union democracy, would be able to force incumbent union 
officials either to act in the interests of their members or be pushed aside from below. 
Many of these ideas were presented in a more fully rounded critique of union officialdom in 
the widely read pamphlet The Miners’ Next Step, published by the Unofficial Reform 
Committee within the South Wales Miners’ Federation in 1912. Yet detailed advice on the 
manner in which officials (including left-wingers) could manoeuvre, the difference between 
their rhetoric and action, the need to build links with sympathetic officials but avoid placing 
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any reliance on their leadership, and the type of demands that could be placed on them (or 
how to build up rank-and-file organisation that could both support them where appropriate 
while being able to act independently of them if necessary) were not really considered.77  
In addition there was the problem of the syndicalists’ ideological anti-leadership 
stance, which influenced their antipathy towards providing an alternative revolutionary 
leadership to that of union officialdom. Significantly, the latter’s deficiencies were blamed 
not on poor direction and wrong-headed policies but on the institution of leadership itself. 
From the fact that shopfloor workers tended to become corrupted once they were elected 
to full-time union office, syndicalists concluded that all leadership, whether from official or 
unofficial sources, was bound to stifle the independence and initiative of the rank-and-file. 
Of course when workers in various industries took strike action without the sanction of their 
union officials, syndicalists were often able and willing to give a lead. But their main effort 
did not involve attempting to construct an alternative leadership to that of union 
officialdom as such, but rather to direct this militancy into the reconstruction of the unions 
on a more democratic, class-wide and revolutionary basis.78 Not until the First World War 
and the rise of the Shop Stewards and Workers’ Committee Movement did British 
syndicalism begin to recognise the need for independent rank-and-file organisation in 
competition with existing union officials.79 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion Yeates has argued the Dublin Lockout was: ‘unquestionably a tragedy’, and an 
unnecessary one, and yet, like all tragedies, it was almost inevitable’.80 Arguably this view is 
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not justified. Although a devastating defeat, the Lockout also stands as a vivid example of 
workers’ defiance, courage and tenacity, combined with the importance of inspirational 
leadership and militant tactics. Crucially it was the solidarity of the British labour movement 
that allowed the Dublin workers to survive for as long as they did. But if the strikers’ fighting 
endurance proved unable to overcome the united front mounted by the Dublin employers 
(backed up by the full weight of the police, judiciary and Catholic Church), the other crucial 
factor in the equation contributing to its defeat was undoubtedly the lack of effective 
sympathetic industrial action in Britain and limitations of rank-and-file and socialist 
organisation to overcome the entrenched resistance of the official union leadership.  
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